# \[Standard Proposal #20\] Protocol Enhancement and Verifier Upgrade

**URL:** <https://community.taiko.xyz/t/standard-proposal-20-protocol-enhancement-and-verifier-upgrade/3893>\
**Category:** 🔬 DAO Proposals\
**Created:** [January 14, 2026, 8:57am UTC](https://community.taiko.xyz/t/standard-proposal-20-protocol-enhancement-and-verifier-upgrade/3893 "2026-01-14T08:57:55Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Page:** 1

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![odesium](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex029/user_avatar/community.taiko.xyz/odesium/32/735_2.png) [@odesium](https://community.taiko.xyz/u/odesium)\
**Post date:** [January 14, 2026, 8:57am UTC](https://community.taiko.xyz/t/standard-proposal-20-protocol-enhancement-and-verifier-upgrade/3893/1 "2026-01-14T08:57:55Z")

</div>

## Proposal description

* * *

## Executive Summary

This proposal implements security enhancements and protocol upgrades for the Taiko Alethia protocol on Ethereum mainnet. The upgrade introduces new trusted ZK proof images for SP1 and Risc0 verifiers, upgrades verifier implementations to improve functionality and performance, and updates SGX attestation parameters to ensure only authorized enclaves can generate valid proofs.

## Rationale

### Background

The Taiko protocol relies on multiple proof systems (ZK and SGX) to ensure the validity of L2 state transitions. As the protocol evolves and security research advances, it is essential to:

1. Update trusted proof images to incorporate latest optimizations and security patches

2. Upgrade verifier contracts to improve gas efficiency and add necessary functionality

3. Maintain strict control over SGX attestation to prevent unauthorized proof generation

## Technical Specification

### 1. ZK Verifier Image Updates

#### 1.1 SP1 (Succinct) Verifier Updates

**Contract** : `0xbee1040D0Aab17AE19454384904525aE4A3602B9`

New trusted images to be added:

- `0x008f96447139673b3f2d29b30ad4b43fe6ccb3f31d40f6e61478ac5640201d9e`

- `0x47cb22384e59cecf65a536612d4b43fe36659f987503db9828f158ac40201d9e`

- `0x00a32a15ab7a74a9a79f3b97a71d1b014cd4361b37819004b9322b502b5f5be1`

- `0x51950ad55e9d2a6973e772f471d1b01466a1b0d95e064012726456a02b5f5be1`

#### 1.2 Risc0 Verifier Updates

**Contract** : `0x73Ee496dA20e5C65340c040B0D8c3C891C1f74AE`

New trusted images to be added:

- `0x3d933868e2ac698df98209b45e6c34c435df2d3c97754bb6739d541d5fd312e3`

- `0x77ff0953ded4fb48bb52b1099cc36c6b8bf603dc4ed9211608c039c7ec31b82b`

### 2. Contract Implementation Upgrades

#### 2.1 Risc0 Verifier Upgrade

**Proxy Contract** : `0x73Ee496dA20e5C65340c040B0D8c3C891C1f74AE`

**New Implementation** : `0xDF6327caafC5FeB8910777Ac811e0B1d27dCdf36`

Key changes:

- Modified `proposeBatch` function return data structure

- Updated Groth16 verifier dependency from `0x34Eda8BfFb539AeC33078819847B36D221c6641c` to `0x7CCA385bdC790c25924333F5ADb7F4967F5d1599` [View implementation diff](**[https://codediff.taiko.xyz/?addr=0x73Ee496dA20e5C65340c040B0D8c3C891C1f74AE&newimpl=0xDF6327caafC5FeB8910777Ac811e0B1d27dCdf36&chainid=1&filter=changed](https://codediff.taiko.xyz/?addr=0x73Ee496dA20e5C65340c040B0D8c3C891C1f74AE&newimpl=0xDF6327caafC5FeB8910777Ac811e0B1d27dCdf36&chainid=1&filter=changed)**)

#### 2.2 PreconfRouter Upgrade

**Proxy Contract** : `0xD5AA0e20e8A6e9b04F080Cf8797410fafAa9688a`

**New Implementation** : `0xafCEDDe020dB8D431Fa86dF6B14C20f327382709`

Key changes:

- Added `getConfig()` view function for improved protocol observability [View implementation diff](**[https://codediff.taiko.xyz/?addr=0xD5AA0e20e8A6e9b04F080Cf8797410fafAa9688a&newimpl=0xafCEDDe020dB8D431Fa86dF6B14C20f327382709&chainid=1&filter=changed](https://codediff.taiko.xyz/?addr=0xD5AA0e20e8A6e9b04F080Cf8797410fafAa9688a&newimpl=0xafCEDDe020dB8D431Fa86dF6B14C20f327382709&chainid=1&filter=changed)**)

### 3. SGX Attestation Updates

#### 3.1 SGX-GETH Attester

**Contract** : `0x0ffa4A625ED9DB32B70F99180FD00759fc3e9261`

New MR\_ENCLAVE value:

- `0x3e6113a23bbdf9231520153253047d02db8f1dd38a9b52914ab7943278f52db0`

_Note: Built with EGo framework (non-EDMM support only)_

#### 3.2 SGX-RETH Attester

**Contract** : `0x8d7C954960a36a7596d7eA4945dDf891967ca8A3`

New MR\_ENCLAVE values:

- `0xe5774b71990b0d5f3eca8d4d22546764dd9549c743a1a6d4d4863d97f6b8c67a` (Non-EDMM mode)

- `0x605ad10c1a56ed7289f198d64a39a952cd3b8a0bed3fcb19c8301c1847dc3a2f` (EDMM-enabled mode)

_Note: Built with Gramine framework (supports both EDMM-enabled and EDMM-disabled SGX)_

## Verification Procedures

### ZK Image Verification

To verify the ZK image IDs:

1. Check out the official release from the repository

2. Run `./script/publish-image.sh` to build the corresponding ZK images

3. Compare the output logs with the proposed image IDs

Example verification output for Risc0:

```auto
#41 550.0 risc0 elf image id: 3d933868e2ac698df98209b45e6c34c435df2d3c97754bb6739d541d5fd312e3
#41 551.7 risc0 elf image id: 77ff0953ded4fb48bb52b1099cc36c6b8bf603dc4ed9211608c039c7ec31b82b

Example verification output for SP1:
#43 131.2 sp1 elf vk bn256 is: 0x008f96447139673b3f2d29b30ad4b43fe6ccb3f31d40f6e61478ac5640201d9e#43 131.2 sp1 elf vk hash_bytes is: 47cb22384e59cecf65a536612d4b43fe36659f987503db9828f158ac40201d9e#43 143.6 sp1 elf vk bn256 is: 0x00a32a15ab7a74a9a79f3b97a71d1b014cd4361b37819004b9322b502b5f5be1#43 143.6 sp1 elf vk hash_bytes is: 51950ad55e9d2a6973e772f471d1b01466a1b0d95e064012726456a02b5f5be1

```

### MR\_ENCLAVE Verification

To verify MR\_ENCLAVE values:

1. Check out the official release (v1.12.0)

2. Run `./script/publish-image.sh [0|1]` (0 for non-EDMM, 1 for EDMM)

3. Compare the output with proposed values

Example verification output:

```auto
# Non-EDMM mode#30 0.205 2025/10/09 03:10:00 INFO EGo version=1.7.0 git_commit=3a3f54a1d1cd9318dd1ade411f9f439f53bb6694#30 0.205 3e6113a23bbdf9231520153253047d02db8f1dd38a9b52914ab7943278f52db0#48 3.653 mr_enclave: e5774b71990b0d5f3eca8d4d22546764dd9549c743a1a6d4d4863d97f6b8c67aEDMM mode#48 3.653 mr_enclave: 605ad10c1a56ed7289f198d64a39a952cd3b8a0bed3fcb19c8301c1847dc3a2f

```

## Security Contacts

- Primary: **[security@taiko.xyz](mailto:security@taiko.xyz)**

- Bug Bounty Program: [Link to program]

## References

- [Raiko Release v1.12.0](**[https://github.com/taikoxyz/raiko/blob/v1.12.0/RELEASE.md](https://github.com/taikoxyz/raiko/blob/v1.12.0/RELEASE.md)**)

- [SP1 Documentation](**[https://docs.succinct.xyz](https://docs.succinct.xyz/)**)

- [Risc0 Documentation](**[https://docs.risczero.com](https://docs.risczero.com/)**)

- [Gramine Project](**[https://gramineproject.io](https://gramineproject.io/)**)

- [EGo Framework](**[https://github.com/edgelesssys/ego](https://github.com/edgelesssys/ego)**)

- [Etherscan - Risc0 Groth16 Verifier](**[https://etherscan.io/address/0x7CCA385bdC790c25924333F5ADb7F4967F5d1599#code](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7CCA385bdC790c25924333F5ADb7F4967F5d1599#code)**)

## Appendix

### A. Glossary

- **MR\_ENCLAVE** : Measurement Register Enclave - A cryptographic hash (SHA-256) of the SGX Enclave binary, serving as a unique fingerprint of the code

- **EDMM** : Enclave Dynamic Memory Management - A feature in newer SGX processors allowing dynamic memory allocation

- **BN256** : A pairing-friendly elliptic curve used in ZK-SNARK constructions

- **Groth16** : An efficient ZK-SNARK proof system

* * *

**Latest Status:**

- **Status:** Executed

- **Type:** Standard Proposal

- **Category:** Protocol Upgrades & Technical Improvements

- **Result:** ✅ Security Council Approved | ✅ Execution Completed

- **Proposal ID:** #20

- **Discussion Period:** 29 October 2025 - 4 November 2025

- **Voting Period:** 5 November 2025 - 26 November 2025

- **Execution Date:** 3 December 2025

**Key Takeaway for Community:**

This proposal represents a comprehensive technical upgrade to Taiko’s proof verification infrastructure, enhancing security, performance, and functionality across multiple verification systems. It demonstrates the DAO’s role in managing critical protocol infrastructure and security parameters.
